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CIVIL PROCEDURE-DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY:
PUNISHING LITTLE SUZY FOR DADDY'S BAD BEHAVIOR-
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS RULE 37
SANCTIONS AFFECTING CHILD SUPPORT DETERMINATIONS
Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 593 N.W.2d 359
I. FACTS
Nancy A. and Dale W. Barth married in 1988 and had three chil-
dren.1 Dale and Nancy lived in a mobile home on Dale's parents' farm-
stead and leased cropland and equipment from his father, Otto Barth, for
$20,000 per year. 2 The parties separated in February 1997, at which
time Nancy and the children left the family home. 3
The trial court granted Nancy a divorce from Dale and gave her
custody of the three children. 4 The trial court awarded Dale four hours
of supervised visitation with the children on the first and third weekends
of each month and ordered Dale to pay child support in the amount of
$452 per month. 5 The trial court awarded Nancy property valued at
$13,193 and debt in the amount of $8,902, for a net property distribu-
tion of $4,291.6 Dale received a net award of $38,125, after the trial
court apportioned property to him valued at $69,375 and debt of
$31,250.7 The trial court ordered Dale to pay Nancy $16,917 on or
before July 1, 1998, in order to equalize property and debts. 8 Dale
1. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 2, 593 N.W.2d 359, 361.
2. See id. Dale entered into a written lease agreement with his father whereby he rented certain
cropland and equipment from his father. See Appellant's Brief at 3, Barth (No. 980241).
3. See Barth, 2, 593 N.W.2d at 361. Both parties alleged infidelity against the other: Nancy
claimed she and her oldest daughter Danica saw Dale and a woman in a van with their pants off late
one evening; Dale claimed Nancy and her sister-in-law brought home two men after drinking at a
local bar. See Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Barth (No. 980241).
4. See Barth, 3, 595 N.W.2d at 361. Danica Oberlander was born in 1981, Desirae Barth was
born in 1988, and Deriann Barth was born in 1992. See id. 1 2.
5. See id. 3. The visitation was required to be supervised because of an incident in November
of 1996 when Danica confronted Dale and called him a "drunk." See Barth v. Barth, No. 97-C-1009,
N.D. BRIEF REP., 593 N.W.2d(l) at 173 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. May 6, 1998), aff'd, 1999 ND 91, 593
N.W.2d 359. Dale responded by shoving and slapping Danica. See id. Nancy Barth reported the
incident to Oliver County Social Services, which subsequently concluded that the allegation of
domestic violence was true and recommended that Dale attend an anger management class. See id.
6. "See Barth, 3, 593 N.W.2d at 361. The debt awarded to Nancy encompassed the total amount
due on a Ford Aspire, which she purchased after separating with Dale. See Property and Debt Listing,
Barth v. Barth, No. 97-C-1009, N.D. BRIEF REP., 593 N.W.2d(l) at 36-38.
7. See Barth, 3, 593 N.W.2d at 361. The debt awarded to Dale included the $20,000 lease to
his father, $1,150 for attorney fees, $500 for parts, $3,000 to Grey Oil for fuel, $3,400 to Minnkota,
$350 to J.C. Penney, $250 to Target, $300 to Daytons, $2,000 to AT&T MasterCard, and $400 to
MedCenter One. See Barth v. Barth, No. 97-C-1009, N.D. BRIEF REP., 593 N.W.2d(l) at 176 (S. Cent.
Dist. Ct. May 6, 1998).
8. See id. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997) (stating a post-marital division of
property must be "just and proper").
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contended that the division of property and the calculation of his income
were clearly erroneous and requested reversal and an adjustment of the
trial court's division of property and income determination. 9
Dale's complaint concerning the division of property was premised
on three quarters of land, which he and his father purchased on a con-
tract for deed in 1991,10 and on Nancy's interest in one quarter of land
that she brought into the marriage."l Dale's complaint concerning the
income determination centered around his 1996 income, in which the
trial court included unreported income of $20,00012 and grain sales in
the amount of $35,848.19.13 Dale also contended on appeal that the trial
court erred in excluding farm expense deductions of $45,271 in his
1997 income determination. 14
The trial court found that Dale failed to comply with discovery
requests' 5 and court orders' 6 that required him to divulge information
regarding his income over the past five years.17 As a sanction for dis-
covery abuse, the trial court did not deduct $45,271 in 1997 farm
expenses when calculating Dale's income. 18 Dale contended that the
total disallowance of 1997 farm expenses was an "abuse of discretion
and contrary to law."19
9. See Barth, 4, 593 N.W.2d at 361.
10. See id. 5, 593 N.W.2d at 361-62. Dale maintained at trial that his name was on the contract
for deed as a matter of convenience and that he had no interest in the property. See Appellee's Brief
at 6, Barth (No. 980241).
11. See Barth, IN 5, 6, 593 N.W.2d at 361-62. Dale contended the trial court erred in not in-
cluding in the post-marriage division of property the $11,000 that Nancy received as a part of her
one-eighth interest in land that was sold in 1997. See id. The trial court elected not to consider the
interest in the sale of Nancy's land because she used the proceeds from the sale to support her move
out of the house and to pay various debts attendant with the move and separation from Dale. See id.
12. See id. 23, 593 N.W.2d at 364. Dale deducted $20,000 on his 1996 tax return for the rent,
but he did not report the income from grain sold in his father's name to pay the rent. See id. Dale
testified at the initial interim hearing that he had given his father grain valued at $20,000 to pay for the
1996 lease, a transaction characterized by the trial court as an unreported barter transaction. See
Appellee's Brief at 10, Barth (No. 980241).
13. See Barth, ' 23, 593 N.W.2d at 364. The office manager at the Benson-Quinn Grain
Elevator in Underwood testified that she issued Dale a check on January 12, 1996, for grain sold in the
amount of $35,848.19. See id. 25.
14. See id. 22.
15. See id. 31, 593 N.W.2d at 365. Dale refused to sign the Rule 8.3 Informational Statement
and also refused to furnish numerous other documents subpoenaed by Nancy. See Appellee's Brief at
3, Barth (No. 980241). North Dakota Court Rule 8.3 provides a blueprint for managing a divorce
case; it mandates that a joint informational statement be drafted including information pertaining to
child custody, property disputes, spousal support, discovery, and a preliminary property and debt
listing.
16. See Barth, 1 31, 593 N.W.2d at 365. Court orders dated October 14, 1997; November 18,
1997; February 5, 1998; and March 23, 1998, all commanded Dale to comply with discovery requests,
and Dale was held in contempt of court on the later three decree dates as a result of his
noncompliance. See id. 31-32, 593 N.W.2d at 365-66.
17. See id. 27, 593 N.W.2d at 364.
18. See id.
19. Id. Dale contended that because this sanction had such a substantial affect on his child
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On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial
court's division of property was not clearly erroneous because the
Supreme Court was not left with a firm and definite conviction that a
mistake had been made in the distribution of the marital estate. 20 The
court further held that the refusal to consider farm expenses in calculat-
ing Dale's income for purposes of determining child support obligations
was an appropriate sanction for discovery violations because it was not
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
North Dakota law dictates that post-marital divisions of property
follow the equitable distribution doctrine. 22 The determination of what
constitutes an equitable division of property is predicated on what are
collectively termed the Ruff-Fisher guidelines. 23 A court determines the
property to be equitably divided through various discovery devices,
including interrogatories and financial disclosure statements. 24 North
Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sets forth the sanctions that are
available to a court to punish a party who has committed an abuse of
discovery.25
A. DIVORCE AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION-THE RUFF-FISHER
GUIDELINES
An equitable post-marital division of property is accomplished
using a combination of statutory and common law principles. 26 North
Dakota courts adopted the common law Ruff-Fisher guidelines in order
to efficiently effectuate the statutory equitable distribution doctrine. 27
support, he was left with an "uncertain, open ended, and continuing penalty." Appellant's Brief at 12,
Barth (No. 980241).
20. See Barth, 21, 593 N.W.2d at 364.
21. See id. TJ 21, 35, 593 N.W.2d at 364, 367.
22. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997). The codified equitable distribution doctrine states:
When a divorce is granted, the court shall make such equitable distribution of the real
and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper, and may compel either
of the parties to provide for the maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to
make such suitable allowances to the other party for support during life or for a shorter
period as to the court may seem just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties
respectively. The court may from time to time modify its orders in these respects.
Id.
23. See Volk v. Volk, 376 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D. 1985) (stating that in order to reach an equitable
distribution of property a court should be guided by the Ruff-Fisher guidelines).
24. See Barth, 31, 593 N.W.2d at 365 (stating that the trial court ordered Dale to answer
interrogatories and comply with other discovery requests).
25. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37.
26. See Volk, 376 N.W.2d at 18 (stating that section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code
governs a court's property distribution in a divorce action and the common law Ruff -Fisher guidelines
guide a court in effectuating the statutory law).
27. See Barth, 1 8, 593 N.W.2d at 362 (stating that only after all statutory requirements are met
may a court properly apply the Ruff-Fisher guidelines).
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The statutorily defined equitable distribution doctrine and its goal of a
"just and proper" division of property are accomplished through the
application of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines. 28
The principle behind the equitable distribution doctrine is to divide
property between spouses according to either need or equity without
regard to title or ownership. 29 A variant of the equitable distribution doc-
trine governs the division of property in all common law states and most
community property states. 30 The dominant equitable distribution
model has two basic, yet conflicting, principles.31 First, property should
be allocated in proportion to the contributions of each spouse; and
second, property should be allocated according to the relative needs of
each spouse. 32 The North Dakota Century Code codifies this dichotomy
by stating, "[T]he court shall make such equitable distribution of the
real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper,
... having regard to the circumstances of the parties." 33  Accordingly,
as long as the court adequately analyzes the circumstances of the parties,
a post-marital division of property need not be equal in order to be
equitable. 34
In 1952, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a court is
required to make an equitable distribution of real and personal property
as "may seem just and proper," depending on the circumstances of
each particular case. 35  The court stated that the ultimate object to be
28. See id.
29. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 249 (3d ed. 1998). The
laws of property normally divide property between individuals according to title and ownership
without regard to what is equitable to the parties. See id.; see also Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND
192, 15, 585 N.W.2d 561, 565 (stating that a property division in North Dakota is premised on
principles of equity rather than on traditional property or partnership law).
30. See ELLMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 249. The only community property states that follow a
strict rule of equal division of marital property based on title are California, New Mexico, and
Arizona. See ELLMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 249. No other community property states or common
law states, including North Dakota, divide property upon divorce entirely according to the strict rule of
equal division. See ELLMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 249.
31. See ELLMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 249.
32. See ELLMEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 269 (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 4.15 cmt. a (A.L.I. Proposed Final Draft, Part 1, 1997)).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997). In the 1947 case of Agrest v. Agrest, 27 N.W.2d 697,
703 (N.D. 1947), the North Dakota Supreme Court, discussing the statutory requirements of a "just and
proper" division of property, stated:
Inasmuch as [the 1943 North Dakota revised code section 14-0524 (now North Dakota
Century Code section 14-05-24)] and cognate statutes contain no statutory enumeration
of the "circumstances" to be considered in making an "equitable distribution," it logically
follows that the division of property or adjustment of property rights upon a divorce
generally depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
34. See Christmann v. Christmann, 1997 ND 209, 6, 570 N.W.2d 221, 223 (stating that while a
court should begin with an equal property division, the division need not be exactly equal to be
equitable).
35. See Ruff v. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (N.D. 1952) (citing Casciola v. Casciola, 27 N.W.2d
65, 66 (Mich. 1947); Byrne v. Byrne, 24 N.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Mich. 1946); Jensen v. Jensen, 15
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sought in the division of property was "an equitable distribution." 36 In
Ruff v. Ruff,3 7 the North Dakota Supreme Court reaffirmed a lower court
division of property resulting from a divorce granted on the grounds of
extreme cruelty by the husband. 38 The parties in Ruff entered the
marriage with approximately equal assets and through "diligent and
industrious" work by both parties managed to accumulate significant
property and assets. 39 In affirming the trial court's division of property,
the court adopted a rule from a line of Nebraska Supreme Court deci-
sions that outlined relevant elements to be considered when equitably
distributing marital property.4 0
In 1966, the North Dakota Supreme Court reinforced the guidelines
set forth in Ruff through Fisher v. Fisher.41 In Fisher, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's division of land acquired
through the joint efforts of a husband and wife during a thirty-year
marriage. 42 The elements examined in Ruff and Fisher form the basis of
what are known as the Ruff-Fisher guidelines which allow a court to
consider the following:
the respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their earning
ability; the duration of and conduct of each during the mar-
riage; their station in life; the circumstances and necessities of
each; their health and physical condition; their financial cir-
cumstances as shown by property owned at the time, its value
at that time, its income-producing capacity, if any, and whether
accumulated or acquired before or after marriage; and from
all such elements the court should determine the rights of the
parties and all other matters pertaining to the case.43
N.W.2d 57, 63 (Neb. 1944); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 237 N.W. 568, 569 (S.D. 1931)).
36. Id. (stating no rigid rule exists for the division of property).
37. 52 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1952).
38. See Ruff, 52 N.W.2d at 110. The allegations accepted by the court included physical abuse,
resulting in grievous bodily injury, and mental abuse, resulting in grievous-mental suffering, which
stemmed from incidents of domestic violence and marital infidelity. See id.
39. See id. at 11l. The court determined that each entered the marriage with six or seven cows
and by the end of the 12-year marriage they had accumulated 640 acres of land with associated
buildings worth $19,200. See id.
40. See Ristow v. Ristow, 41 N.w.2d 924, 926 (Neb. 1950) (reaffirming that in an alimony or
property division determination the factors first set forth in Swolec v. Swolec, 241 N.W. 771, 773 (Neb.
1932), apply). In Swolec, the Nebraska court stated that because the trial court has broad discretion in
determining alimony and property division, certain factors need be considered. See 241 N.W.2d at
773; see also Holmes v. Holmes, 41 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Neb. 1950) (reiterating the holding in Swolec,
241 N.W.2d at 773, that certain factors are to be looked at in determining alimony or a division of
property in a divorce proceeding).
41. 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966).
42. See Fisher v. Fisher, 139 N.W.2d 845, 854 (N.D. 1966) (finding a division awarding 400
acres of land including the homestead to the wife, and 440 acres of land to the husband, equitable
under all the facts and circumstances).
43. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d at Ill (adopting factors to be examined in the determination of an equitable
division of property in a post marriage property division); see also Tuff v. Tuff, 333 N.W.2d 421, 423
(N.D. 1983) (stating that while no set rules apply in the equitable distribution of property, the
20001 637
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The Ruff-Fisher guidelines allow a court to consider and balance all
of the relevant factors in a post-marriage division of property without
any one factor weighing more heavily than any other does.44 Each
factor of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines should be considered by a court in
equitably distributing property and must be reasonably discernible by
inference or deduction. 45 Subsequent cases have further defined and
clarified the common law Ruff-Fisher guidelines.
46
A trial court's determination regarding valuation and division of
marital property is treated as a finding of fact and will be reversed on
appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.4 7 Absent a firm and definite con-
viction that a mistake has been made, a reviewing court will not make a
finding that a division of property is clearly erroneous. 48 Further, a find-
ing of fact may be deemed clearly erroneous only if it was induced by
an erroneous view of the law or if there was no evidence to support the
fact.49
The North Dakota Legislature and the North Dakota Supreme Court
have set forth specific statutory and common law requirements regulat-
ing the post-marital division of property.50 Although a post-marital divi-
sion of property is not always equal, an equitable division of property is
best achieved through application of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines that have
been adopted and defined by the North Dakota Supreme Court. 5 1 In
order to ensure that a proper application of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines
occurs, a party must comply with all disclosure of information require-
ments set forth in the rules of discovery.
52
Ruff-Fisher guidelines should be considered); Fisher, 139 N.W.2d at 851-52 (stating it logically
follows that, "the division of property or adjustment of property rights upon divorce generally depends
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case").
44. See Blowers v. Blowers, 377 N.W.2d 127, 129 (N.D. 1985) (stating express findings of each
Ruff-Fisher guideline are not necessary).
45. See Lentz v. Lentz, 353 N.W.2d 742, 745 (N.D. 1984) (citing Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d
819, 822 (N.D. 1983); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D. 1979)).
46. See, e.g., Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, 1 9, 585 N.W.2d 561, 564 (reinforcing the
court's application of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines in equitably distributing property in a post-marriage
division of property); Anderson v. Anderson, 390 N.W.2d 554, 556 (N.D. 1986) (holding the length of
a marriage in which traditional provider/homemaker roles are assumed still mandates the application
of Ruff -Fisher guidelines and that in a long-term marriage an equal division is presumed); Nastrom,
284 N.W.2d at 581 (affirming trial court's application of the Ruff-Fisher guidelines concerning age
and income earning ability).
47. See Grinaker v. Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d 204, 208 (N.D. 1996) (citing Volson v. Volson, 542
N.W.2d 754, 756 (N.D. 1996)). See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that "findings of fact...
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").
48. See Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d at 208.
49. See Kautzman, 1 8, 585 N.W.2d at 564 (citing Gierke v. Gierke, 1998 ND 100, 15, 578
N.W.2d 522, 526).
50. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997); Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 8, 593
N.W.2d 359, 362.
51. See Kautzman, 7, 585 N.W.2d at 564 (stating a post-marital division of property does not
have to be equal to be equitable).
52. See Barth, 29, 593 N.W.2d at 365 (stating complete compliance with discovery requests is
required).
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B. RULE 37-FAILURE TO MAKE OR COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY;
SANCTIONS
Both the processes by which parties accumulate information for a
lawsuit and the rules governing this process are collectively termed
"discovery." 53 Discovery occurs in a variety of methods and manners
and aids both sides to litigate effectively and efficiently. 54 Courts may
impose penalties against a party for failing to adequately provide all
relevant information pertinent to ongoing or impending litigation. 55
North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 37 authorizes a court to
impose sanctions on a party for failing to make or cooperate in
discovery.5 6 North Dakota Rule 37 is based on Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.S7 First adopted in 1938, Federal Rule 37 was
entitled "Refusal to Make Discovery; Consequences." 5 8 Except for a
minor change in 1949,59 Federal Rule 37 remained unchanged until
1970, when its language was modified considerably but not its scope or
substance.
60
The advisory committee notes accompanying the 1970 amendment
indicated that "[e]xperience has brought to light a number of defects in
the language of the rule as well as instances in which it is not serving the
purposes for which it was designed." 61 The major textual revision of
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, through the 1970
53. See generally N.D. R. Cirv. P. 26 (covering general provisions of discovery); N.D. R. Cirv. P.
27 (concerning depositions before an action or pending appeal); N.D. R. Civ. P. 28 (detailing the
persons before whom depositions may be taken); N.D. R. Civ. P. 29 (detailing stipulations regarding
discovery procedures); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30 (setting forth the requirements for depositions upon oral
examination); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30.1 (detailing the uniform audiovisual deposition rule); N.D. R. Civ. P.
31 (concerning depositions of witnesses upon written questions); N.D. R. Civ. P. 32 (detailing the use
of depositions in court proceedings); N.D. R. Civ. P. 33 (covering interrogatories); N.D. R. Civ. P. 34
(detailing the requirements for the production of documents and things and entry upon land for
inspection and other purposes); N.D. R. Civ. P. 35 (covering the mental and physical examinations of
persons); N.D. R. Civ. P. 36 (concerning requests for admission); N.D. R. Civ. P. 37 (detailing
sanctions available for non-compliance with any discovery rules).
54. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 26-36.
55. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37 (granting courts broad discretion in imposing sanctions/penal-
ties for failing to provide requested information).
56. See id. (stating a court may impose sanctions against a party for failing to provide requested
information).
57. See Thompson v. Ziebarth, 334 N.W.2d 192, 193 (N.D. 1983) (stating North Dakota Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 37 is patterned after Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37). See generally 8A
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 2284 (2d. ed. 1994 & Supp. 2000).
58. See id. at 558 n.l.
59. This change brought up to date a statutory reference in subdivision (e) that substituted "Title
28 U.S.C. § 1783" for the statutory reference of "Title 28 U.S.C. § 711," which originally appeared in
the subdivision. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, at 589 n. 1.
60. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281, at 597 (discussing the purpose and history of the
rule).
61. 48 F.R.D. 487, 538 (1970).
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amendment, was to clarify dual terminology in the original rule. 62 Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in its original form was
inconsistent, because it referred to a "failure" to afford discovery in
some sections and in other sections referred to a "refusal" to afford
discovery. 63 This inconsistency in terminology led to different interpre-
tations by lower courts. 64 For example, some courts interpreted "refus-
al" to require "willfulness," despite a U.S. Supreme Court ruling stating
the use of the two words implied no distinct meaning and that they were
fairly interchangeable. 65 In response to the confusion between the mean-
ing and application of the two words, the advisory committee substituted
the word "failure" for the word "refusal" throughout the rule in order
to promote uniformity of interpretation.66
Other changes brought by the 1970 amendment included the broad-
ening of Rule 37 subsection (a). 67 Prior to the 1970 amendment, subsec-
tion (a) formally allowed only an order to compel answers to questions
at a deposition or compel answers to interrogatories. 68 The 1970 amend-
ment broadened subsection (a) to include all discovery devices, except
physical and mental exams because those require a court order. 69 The
amendment further specified the appropriate court for making a Rule 37
motion. 70 The awarding of attorney's fees for frivolous requests was
also broadened in the hopes of inducing courts to grant these types of
awards more frequently. 7 1 A number of other changes were made to




65. See id. See generally Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commer-
ciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1958) (concluding that the random use of the two terms
in Rule 37 did not show a design for them to be used with consistently distinctive meanings, that
"refused" simply meant a failure to comply, and that "willfulness" only applied to the actual sanction
applied).
66. See 48 F.R.D. 487, 539 (1970) (stating the substitution should bring the rule into harmony with
Societe Internationale).
67. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 597. The 1970 addition to Rule 37(a)(3) allowed
a court to treat an incomplete or evasive answer as a failure to answer. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 57, § 2285 at 644.
68. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 597. With the 1970 amendment, Rule 37(a)
made a motion to compel discovery applicable to inspection of documents and things under Rule 34.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2285 at 642. Prior to this amendment, a court order under Rule 34
was a prerequisite to an inspection, and Rule 37(a) was not necessary. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
57, § 2285 at 642. The amendment made inspection permissible without a court order. See WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 57, § 2285 at 642.
69. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 597.
70. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 597. Prior to the 1970 amendments, Rule 37 did
not specify which court had power to act when a deposition was being taken in one district for use in a
case pending in another district. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2287 at 650.
71. See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 598. The Advisory Committee's Notes stated the
change was intended to encourage judges to be more alert to discovery abuses because, before 1970
courts were extremely reluctant to impose sanctions. See 48 F.R.D. 487, 539 (1970).
640 [VOL. 76:633
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clarify unclear points.72 Minor changes in Rule 37 also occurred in
198073 and 1993.74
A Rule 37 sanction appeal will be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and will only be set aside on appeal if there has been
an abuse of that discretion by the trial court. 75  Courts and commenta-
tors, however, have had difficulty defining abuse of discretion. 76 Abuse
of discretion has been defined in a wide variety of cases and contexts,
including acts or decisions outside the normal course of proceedings,
actions stepping outside the limits of discretion, decisions in error as a
matter of law, and arbitrary or capricious actions. 77 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it
acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. 78 Firm,
definite rules concerning the imposition of discovery sanctions are
rare. 79 Principle concerns of an appellate court reviewing a district court
decision are the timing and severity of sanctions to be imposed by the
lower courts. 80 However, the power to impose discovery sanctions is
limited despite the broad discretion afforded to trial courts. 8 1
Constitutional limits associated with Rule 37 sanctions are grounded
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 2
One due process issue courts must address when imposing sanctions is
72. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 598. These changes included the broadening of
Rule 37(c) to provide for an award of expenses if a party refused to make an admission under Rule 36
and a clarification of what needed to be shown in order to avoid the awarding of expenses. See
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 598.
73. See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 599 (abrogating Rule 37(e) because neither Rule
37(e) nor the statute to which it referred, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (stating when a court may issue a subpoena
for a person or document in a foreign country) was related in any way to sanctions for discovery
abuses). See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2292 at 736.
74. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2281 at 599-600 (imposing a meet and confer require-
ment, adding an inclusion of evidence provision, and changing the provisions for identifying the
appropriate courts).
75. See Wolf v. Estate of Seright, 1997 ND 240, 17, 573 N.W.2d 161, 165 (stating a trial court
has discretionary authority to decide appropriate sanctions for a failure to supplement interrogatories
and those decisions will only be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
76. See 1 C.J.S. Abuse 392 (1985).
77. See id. at 394.
78. See Towne v. Dinius, 1997 ND 125, 14, 565 N.W.2d 762, 766 (finding the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering the payment of attorney's fees because the court did not act
"arbitrarily, unreasonable, or unconscionably").
79. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2284 at 613. Flexibility of the rule is necessary because
the needs of the discovering party as well as the nature of the noncompliance often need to be
evaluated. See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 57, § 2284 at 613 n.2.
80. See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 57, § 2284 at 613.
81. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2284 at 613.
82. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2283 at 605. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV
(standing for the general proposition that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law). Rule 37 sanctions allow a court to enter a default judgment and or strike
pleadings and answers, and therefore, these sanctions may implicate due process concerns. See
generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37.
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the relationship between the discovery and the merits that will be fore-
closed by the sanction. 83 That relationship must be sufficient to justify
depriving the party of the opportunity to litigate the claim based on
those merits. 84 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Brown v.
McCormick85 that discovery sanctions assessed in an arbitrary manner are
violative of due process and a judgment based on those sanctions is
void. 86 In Brown, the appellants failed to appear for a deposition, and
the court ordered their pleadings to be stricken as a Rule 37 sanction. 87
The court found that because of appellants "dilatory tactics," and the
fact that their attorney had notice of the default hearing, no due process
violation occurred. 88 Next, to ensure that due process is properly served,
the ability of the party to comply with the discovery request should be
addressed before a court imposes a serious "merits sanction." 89
However, in Hovey v. Elliott,90 the U.S. Supreme Court determined
that refusal of all rights to defend an action or to issue a judgment
without any hearing whatsoever denies an individual due process of
law. 91 In Hovey, the court entered a decree pro confess092 against the
defendants and struck their answer as a result of a refusal to obey an
order by the court pertinent to the suit pending against them.93 Justice
White found that to deny the defendants the right to defend would run
counter to the judicial system and would, in effect, "convert the court
exercising such an authority into an instrument of wrong and oppres-
sion, and hence to strip it of that attribute of justice upon which the
exercise of judicial power necessarily depends." 94 Accordingly, a
sanction must have limits and cannot completely deprive an individual of
due process rights. 95
83. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2283 at 605.
84. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2283 at 605.
85. 608 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979).
86. Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 414-15 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding a default judgment was
valid and Rule 37 sanctions were not violative of due process when notice of default judgment hearing
is provided to a litigant's attorney).
87. See id. at 412. Appellants had several attorneys withdraw as counsel and were issued
several extensions. See id.
88. See id. at 414.
89. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 57, § 2283 at 605.
90. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
91. See Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1897) ("The fundamental conception of a court
of justice is condemnation only after [a] hearing.").
92. A decree pro confesso is "one entered in favor of the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
failure to timely respond to the allegations in the plaintiff's bill." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th
ed. 1999).
93. See Hovey, 167 U.S. at 411-12. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia struck the
defendants' answer after they refused to pay $49,297.50 to the registry of the courts that had been
previously paid to them by the receiver in a land claim. See id.




The Supreme Court distinguished the Hovey decision in the 1909
case of Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.96 In Hammond, the defen-
dant defied a court order by refusing to produce information before a
commissioner concerning an action under Arkansas antitrust law.97 As a
result of the noncompliance, the court struck the company's answer and
a default judgment was granted. 98 In affirming the state court decision,
Justice White stated that the striking out of the answer and entering of
default judgment was a punishment, but only remotely so, "as the
generating source of the power was the right to create a presumption
flowing from the failure to produce." 99 Justice White found Hovey
distinguishable from this case because it involved a "denial of all right
to defend as a mere punishment" that denied due process by a refusal to
hear.l00 In Hammond, on the other hand, "[t]he preservation of due
process was secured by the presumption that the refusal to produce
evidence material to the administration of due process was but an admis-
sion of the want of merit in the asserted defense."101
Forty-nine years later, in Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,lO2 the Supreme Court
returned to the due process concerns of Hovey and Hammond.l0 3 In
Societe Internationale, a Swiss holding company brought an action
against the United States Attorney General and the Treasurer of the
United States to recover property seized during World War II as property
owned by an enemy national.104 The lower court dismissed the plain-
tiff's action because it failed to comply with an order to produce
documents, even though the plaintiff made a good faith effort to comply
with the order. 105 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision,
stating, "we think that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize
96. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
97. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 339 (1909). The requested informa-
tion included "numerous books, papers, and documents bearing upon the issues in this cause and
relevant to the claim." Id. at 337.
98. See id. at 340.
99. Id. at 351; see also Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 446-47 (1897).
100. Hammond, 212 U.S. at 351; see also Hovey, 167 U.S. at 444.
101. Hammond, 212 U.S. at 351.
102. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
103. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1958); see also Hammond, 212 U.S. at 325; Hovey, 167 U.S. at 414-19.
104. See Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 198-99. The assets, valued at over $100,000,000,
consisted of cash in American banks and stocks in a Delaware corporation. See id. at 199. The Swiss
company brought action under section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. See 50 U.S.C. app., §
9(a) (1994). This section authorizes recovery of assets by a person not an enemy or ally of an enemy
that has a legal interest in those assets. See id.
105. See Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 200. The petitioner moved to be relieved from pro-
ducing the documents on the grounds that disclosure of the required records would violate Swiss law
and might lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions against it. See id.
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dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a
pretrial production order when .. .that failure to comply has been due
to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of peti-
tioner." 106 Thus, Societe Internationale held that a failure to respond to
a court order, despite a good faith effort at compliance, is noncom-
pliance and brings Rule 37 into play, but the sanction of dismissal
cannot be imposed if the failure was caused by an inability to comply.' 07
The procedural environment in which Rule 37 exists distinguishes
between two types of misconduct: evasive or incomplete answers and a
complete failure to respond to discovery requests.108 Rule 37 provides
for a multi-step analysis in the examination of an evasive or incomplete
answer 109 and a one-step process where there is a complete failure to
respond.1l0 In cases of incomplete or evasive answers by a party to
deposition questions or interrogatories, Rule 37 allows the court to
require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion, the attorney
advising the conduct, or both, to pay the moving party reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.",i
Furthermore, when a party refuses or fails to comply with a court ques-
tion or an order in a deposition, Rule 37 allows a judge to hold the party
in contempt. 112 If a party fails to obey an order by the court in which
the action is pending, the court may issue orders relating to that failure
which are determined to be just.113 Some states, such as North Dakota,
have patterned their state civil procedure Rule 37 and its interpretation
after the federal rule. 114
106. Id. at 212.
107. See id. at 212-13.
108. See Adam Behar, Note, The Misuse of Inherent Powers When Imposing Sanctions For Dis-
covery Abuse: The Exclusivity of Rule 37, 9 C tRozo L. REV. 1779, 1779-80 (1988) (questioning the
courts' need to resort to inherent powers to impose sanctions for discovery abuse in light of an existing
governing rule). See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3) (stating that evasive or incomplete answers
are to be treated as a failure to answer); N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) (stating that failure to comply with an
order may be considered a contempt of that court).
109. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (setting forth the methodology of first making a motion compelling
discovery and only then employing court imposed expenses and sanctions).
110. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) (stating failure by a deponent to answer a question after being
asked may be considered contempt of court); see also Behar, supra note 108, at 1779.
111. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A) (outlining the expenses and sanctions available).
112. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) ("If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after
being directed to do so by the court in the judicial district in which the deposition is being taken, the
failure may be considered a contempt of that court.").
113. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). These orders include, but are not limited to: (1) an order that
matters regarding the order made or any other facts will be treated as established for the purposes of
the action in agreement with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (2) an order refusing to allow
the insubordinate party to support or oppose designated claims or prohibiting that party from
introducing designated matters in evidence; (3) or an order striking all or some pleadings, staying
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action, or rendering a default judgment. See id.
114. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37.
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Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court applies "interpretive
federal caselaw" in construing the application of Rule 37 in North
Dakota.11 5 Sanctions for discovery abuse serve two purposes:11 6 first, as
a penalty against those whose conduct is deemed to merit a sanction, and
second, as a deterrent to others.l 17 In all its forms, discovery is the
"make or break device of the whole system," and unless discovery rules
function in the appropriate way, litigants may be unprepared and issues
in the case may be broad and underdeveloped."i 8 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has found that the need to deter discovery abuses, pro-
mote efficient litigation, and protect the interests of the parties justifies
resolving a case on its merits.119
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the importance of
complying with a discovery request in Vorachek v. Citizens State
Bank,120 which held that a party is not at liberty to "pick and choose"
the information to be provided or withheld in an action. 121 The court
stated that the rules of civil procedure require complete, accurate, and
timely compliance. 122 The court further stated that selective and substan-
tial compliance is not enough. 123 Thus, the court held that the discovery
process would be "rendered useless" if parties were allowed to withhold
certain information because they had previously provided a portion of
the requested information.124 The court listed effective litigation and the
115. Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank, 421 N.W.2d 45, 49 (N.D. 1988) (citing as examples, Shark
v. Thompson, 373 N.W.2d 859, 863 (N.D. 1985); St. Aubbin v. Nelson, 329 N.W.2d 874, 876 (N.D.
1983)).
116. See Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 507 N.W.2d 527, 533 (N.D. 1993).
117. See generally National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (stating sanctions for discovery abuses are available not only to penalize discovery abuses but
also to deter them); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 480, 483 (1958) (stating that to be efficient, effective and fair, discovery rules should
provide apt penalties in the rules; clearly state that every violation will be enforced; allow the courts a
wide range of sanctions to deal fairly with a wide variety of situations; and prevent the erosion of
court integrity by dealing with the evasion of court orders more sternly).
118. Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 480, 482 (stating the main objective of Rule 37 is to promote
free and full disclosure of relevant, non-privileged information, which, as a concept, is widely applaud-
ed in the abstract but resisted in practice).
119. See St. Aubbin, 329 N.W.2d at 876 (citing City of Fargo v. Candor Constr., Inc., 260 N.W.2d
8, 10 (N.D. 1977) ("[1]f there is too literal an adherence to the 'reach-the-merits' philosophy and
sanctions for procedural rules violations are never used, disrespect for the rule is promoted and the
purpose of the rule is soon lost.")).
120. 421 N.W.2d 45 (N.D. 1988).
121. See Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank, 421 N.W.2d 45, 51, 55 (N.D. 1988) (reversing and
remanding a trial court decision that entered a default judgment as a sanction for noncompliance with
discovery).
122. See id. at 51 (stating the court was unaware of any authority that suggested substantial
compliance with discovery is acceptable).
123. See id. (citing, as examples, Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103 F.R.D. 52, 61
(D.D.C. 1984) and Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 96 F.R.D. 141,145-46 (N.D. 11. 1982)).
124. See id.
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protection of the interests of all parties to a suit as important interests
served when the parties comply with discovery.125
The court has further defined and limited the scope and application
of discovery abuse sanctions by indicating that the sanctions imposed
must be tailored to126 and proportional to the severity of the conduct. 127
In following this premise, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
imposing appropriate sanctions for abuses of discovery.128 In Vorachek,
the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that Rule 37 envisions a "case
by case analysis" of all circumstances presented in each particular case
and warned against placing too much emphasis on comparisons of cases
and the sanctions imposed in those decisions.1 29 This will allow a trial
court to maintain its discretion in imposing sanctions dependant upon
the facts of each particular case. 130
III. ANALYSIS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In reviewing Barth v. Barth1 31 on appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court analyzed the trial court's decision regarding two differ-
ent issues. 132 The court first reviewed the trial court's division of prop-
erty and addressed various issues raised by Dale in his brief on appeal.133
The court then reviewed the trial court's calculation of Dale's income
and the role of Rule 37 sanctions in that determination. 134
1. The Valuation and Division of Marital Property
In Barth, the North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis with a
survey of North Dakota case law establishing the appellate standard of
125. See id. (stating that in order to protect these important interests the most severe sanctions
must be available to penalize and deter discovery abuses).
126. See id. (recognizing that the degree of a party's disobedience may be considered in
determining the severity of the sanction to be imposed).
127. See Dethloff v. Dethloff, 1998 ND 45, 16, 574 N.W.2d 867, 871 (concluding a sanction of
default was appropriate and proportional in a case where there was intentional delay, evasion, and
nonresposiveness to discovery requests).
128. See Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank, 421 N.W.2d 45, 50 (N.D. 1988) (determining that
dismissing a case or entering a default judgment is only within the providence of the trial court when
the noncompliance has been deliberate or in bad faith).
129. Id. at 51.
130. See id.
131. 1999 ND 91,593 N.W.2d 359.
132. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, IN 1-37, 593 N.W.2d 359, 361-67.
133. See id. 5-21, 593 N.W.2d at 361-64. Dale contended on appeal that the trial court erred
in including three quarters of land that he and his father bought on a contract for deed and in
excluding Nancy's one-eighth interest in one quarter of land. See Appellant's Brief at 7-10, Barth
(No. 980241).
134. See Barth, U 22-35, 593 N.W.2d at 364-67.
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review for issues regarding the valuation and distribution of marital
property.135 Justice Neumann, writing for a unanimous court, noted that
the trial court's valuation and division of property was a finding of fact,
and therefore, reversal on appeal would onl' be granted if the decision
was clearly erroneous. 13 6 In order for the North Dakota Supreme Court
to determine that a trial court's division of marital property was clearly
erroneous, the trial court's decision must fall into one of three specific
scenarios. 137
The first scenario, leading an appeals court to find a division of
marital property as clearly erroneous, is when a decision had been
induced by an erroneous view of the law.138 The second scenario would
arise when there was no evidence to support the division. 139 The final
scenario would involve a decision where there was some evidence to
support the division, but on review of the entire evidence, the appellate
court was left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake had been
made. 140 The Barth court also stated that in reviewing a marital division
of property, it would presume that the trial court's finding of facts were
correct, and the complaining party on appeal had the burden of proof to
demonstrate that a finding of fact was clearly erroneous. 141
In order to build a framework from which to analyze Dale's claims,
the North Dakota Supreme Court first surveyed statutory and case law
requirements of what property should be included in a post-marital
division of property. 142 Both case law authority and statutory authority
required the inclusion of "all of the property accumulated by the par-
ties, both jointly and individually owned."143 Citing statutory authority,
135. See id. 1 7, 593 N.W.2d at 362.
136. See id. " 7-21, 593 N.W.2d at 362-64. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("[Flindings of
fact, ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ...."). The North Dakota Supreme Court
recently reinforced the clearly erroneous standard of review in three post-marital division of property
cases. See Gregg v. Gregg, 1998 ND 204, 1 13, 586 N.W.2d 312, 315 (reaffirming the equitable
distribution doctrine and the standard of review on appeal in an approximately equal post marriage
division of property); Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, 8, 585 N.W.2d 561, 564 (stating a trial
court's determination of equity is presumptively correct absent a finding that the trial court decision
was clearly erroneous); Linrud v. Linrud, 1998 ND 55, 7, 574 N.W.2d 875, 878 (stating that a trial
court's findings are presumptively correct with the burden on the complaining party to demonstrate on
appeal that a finding is clearly erroneous (citing Zuger v. Zuger, 1997 ND 97, 6, 563 N.W.2d 804,
806)).




141. See id. (citing Kautzman, 8, 585 N.W.2d at 564; Linrud, 7, 574 N.W.2d at 877; Grinaker
v. Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d 204, 208 (N.D. 1996) (explaining the holdings of Buzick v. Buzick, 542
N.W.2d 756 (N.D. 1996) and Fenske v. Fenske, 542 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1996) that trial court findings
are presumptively correct unless, on review of the entire record, the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made)).
142. See id.
143. Hoge v. Hoge, 281 N.W.2d 557, 561 (N.D. 1979) (stating that under North Dakota Century
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the court stated that all property, regardless of the source, must be
included in the post-marital distribution of property.144 The court relied
on Grinaker v. Grinaker,145 where it had previously emphasized that
regardless of the method in which the property was acquired, whether
brought into the marriage by one party or gifted or inherited as separate
property, it "must be included in the marital estate and is subject to
distribution." 146
The court reiterated its holding from Linrud v. Linrud147 that a trial
court can only apply the Ruff-Fisher guidelines and properly consider
the sources of the property in equitably distributing the marital property
after all the assets are included in the marital estate. 148 The court further
reaffirmed the Linrud holding that when a long-term marriage is in-
volved, an equal division of property is a sensible starting point. 149
Using this starting point, the court began the Barth review with the
premise that, in reviewing a trial court's property division, an equal
division of marital property is the starting point and any disparities in
that equal division by the trial court must be explained.150
The court first reviewed the trial court's determination of the
ownership, valuation, and distribution of the three quarters of land which
Dale and Otto Barth purchased on a contract for deed in 1991.151
Despite conflicting evidence and testimony, the trial court found that
Dale owned a one-half interest in the three quarters of land. 152 At trial,
Nancy introduced as an exhibit the contract for deed, which reinforced
the assertion that Dale owned a one-half interest in the land at issue. 153
Dale maintained that he lacked ownership of the land and stated the only
reason his name was on the deed was "for [a] secondary name." 15 4
Code section 14-05-24, a court must consider all property owned by both parties in a post marriage
division of property).
144. See Barth, 8, 593 N.W.2d at 362 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997); Zuger v.
Zuger, 1997 ND 97, 8, 563 N.W.2d 804, 806).
145. 553 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1996).
146. Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d at 208.
147. 552 N.W.2d 342, 344 (N.D. 1996).
148. See Barth, 8, 593 N.W.2d at 362 (citing Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 344 (N.D.
1996)).
149. See id
150. See id. (citing Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, 21, 585 N.W.2d 561, 567).
151. See id. 99 9-13, 593 N.W.2d at 362-63.
152. See id. 9, 593 N.W.2d at 362. Nancy testified at trial that the three quarters of land
purchased on a contract for deed was purchased jointly by Dale and Otto Barth and paid for through
the sale of cattle and grain. See id. Dale testified that he did not own any land, pointing to the fact that
he made none of the payments, did not control the land, and that his father, Otto Barth, paid the taxes
on the land. See id. 1 12, 593 N.W.2d at 363.
153. See id. 1 10, 593 N.W.2d at 362. The contract for deed, executed on December 30, 1991,
gave a legal description of the land and recited that it is, "by and between KENNETH PORSBORG
and DARLENE PORSBORG, husband and wife,... and OTTO BARTH and DALE BARTH, father
and son." Id.
154. Id. 12, 593 N.W.2d at 363. Dale continued, stating, "The way that was wrote up was for
a contract for deed. If there is a default on a payment, that my dad would not have been able to make
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The North Dakota Supreme Court referred to Gregg v. Gregg155 to
assist it in resolving the dispute between the conflicting evidence re-
garding the issue of Dale's partial ownership of the land in question.1
56
In Gregg, the court resolved an appeal of an initial child custody deter-
mination and held that making a choice between two permissible views
of conflicting evidence is not clearly erroneous. 157 Following that prece-
dent, the court concluded that the trial court's decision that Dale owned
a one-half interest in the three quarters of land, valued at the 1991
purchase price, was not clearly erroneous. 158
The court next considered Dale's complaint that the proceeds from
the sale of one quarter of land, in which Nancy had an interest before the
marriage, should have been included in the marital estate. 159 The court
recognized the general rule that the financial status of divorcing parties,
as it exists at the time of commencement of an action, ordinarily should
be maintained until the court has time to determine the rights of the
parties to that property.1 60 However, an exception to this general rule
may be triggered in situations where there is an immediate need to cover
normal expenses in the transition from married life to single life. 161 The
court referred to a 1999 case, Fox v. Fox,162 in which it reiterated that "a
disadvantaged spouse is not required to deplete her property distribution
in order to live." 163 The court recognized that the current situation was
one in which Nancy needed to cover expenses in order to successfully
transition herself and the children from married to single life. 164
North Dakota precedent maintains that the value of transferred
assets should be included in the dissipating party's share of the marital
property distribution in order to reach an equitable property division. 165
The court in Barth distinguished this holding from that of Linrud by
stating that the mere fact a marital asset had been converted to another
form did not mean it had been wasted or that the net marital assets had
a payment on it in any way, the land would have went back to Porsborgs." Id.
155. 1998 ND 204, 586 N.W.2d 312.
156. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 13, 593 N.W.2d 359, 363 (citing Gregg v. Gregg, 1998
ND 204, 7, 586 N.W.2d 312, 314).
157. See Gregg, 12, 586 N.W.2d at 315.
158. See Barth, 13, 593 N.W.2d at 363.
159. See id. 14. The court noted that the land was sold in 1997, and Nancy received $11,000
for her interest in the land. See id. The trial court did not specifically deal with the issue of Nancy's
premarital interest in the land or her management of the proceeds from its sale. See id.
160. See id. 15.
161. See id. Examples include replacing household items, purchasing a car, or moving to another
residence. See id.
162. 1999 ND 68, 592 N.W.2d 541.
163. Barth, 15, 593 N.W.2d at 363 (citing Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, 24, 592 N.W.2d 541, 548
(reversing and remanding the trial court's division of marital property)).
164. See id.
165. See Halvorson v. Halvorson, 482 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (N.D. 1992) (stating that a party's dis-
sipation of marital assets is a particularly relevant factor in deciding an equitable distribution of a
marital estate).
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been reduced.166 The court noted that, at the time of trial, more than one
year had passed since Nancy and the children left the family home.167
The court further noted that all of the proceeds from the sale of Nancy's
land were accounted for by Nancy and, therefore, did not constitute
fiscal misconduct.168
The court distinguished Nancy's dissipation of the proceeds from
the sale of her land from the dissipation that occurred in Bell v. Bell.169
In Bell, the husband dissipated almost ninety percent of the marital assets
through his illegal flight from justice. 170 Conversely, Nancy's use of the
proceeds from the sale of land did not materially affect the accumulation
or distribution of marital property and therefore, was not considered
dissipation or waste by the court.171 The North Dakota Supreme Court,
accordingly, concluded that the trial court did not err in failing to in-
clude in the marital estate Nancy's premarital interest in land sold in
1997.172
After a review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme
Court was not left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake had
been made.173 Therefore, the court held that the trial court findings
concerning the distribution of marital property were not clearly
erroneous.174 The court next examined Dale's claim that the trial
court's calculation of his income for the purpose of determining child
support was clearly erroneous.175
2. The Calculation of Dale's Income
The court examined three separate claims by Dale with respect to
the trial court's calculation of his income. 176 The first claim centered on
166. See Barth, 16, 593 N.W.2d at 363 (citing Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 345 (N.D.
1996)).
167. See id. 17.
168. See id. 17. Nancy introduced an exhibit at trial showing she spent $8,697 paying bills, re-
paying debts, paying for babysitting, paying attorney fees, and making a down payment on a car
(which the trial court awarded to Nancy along with its attendant debt). See id. Nancy further testified
the balance of the money was used for "buying clothes and food and whatever since I left Dale, odds
and end stuff." Id.
169. 540 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1995).
170. See Bell v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d 602, 603 (N.D. 1995). Kyle Bell was arrested for gross sexual
imposition upon children. See State v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1995). After Bell posted $20,000
in ball, purchased a 1988 Buick, and fled to Colorado, thus forfeiting the bond amount, the trial court
determined that forfeiting the bond constituted marital waste. See Bell v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 603.
171. See Barth, 19, 593 N.W.2d at 364 (citing Bell v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 605 (awarding all
marital assets to wife after the husband distributed 90% of all assets to himself and then dissipated
them without regard to his wife or children)).
172. See id. 20.
173. See id. 21.
174. See id. 21.
175. See id. 22.
176. See id. 1 23-36, 593 N.W.2d at 364-67.
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the trial court's inclusion of $20,000 in his 1996 income. 177 The second
claim concerned the inclusion of grain sales totaling $35,848.19 in his
1996 income. 178 Finally, the third claim dealt with the exclusion of
1997 farm expenses in the amount of $45,271.179
The court summarily disposed of the first claim concerning unre-
ported income of $20,000 based on a discrepancy between Dale's
testimony at an interim hearing and his 1996 income tax returns.
18 0
Dale testified he had no income from grain sales in 1996, even though
his 1996 tax return showed a deduction of $20,000 for rent.181 Since
Dale took the $20,000 rent deduction, but failed to report income for
grain sold in his father's name to pay rent, the deduction was included as
income.18 2 The court concluded that the inclusion of the $20,000 in
unreported income in 1996 did not make the court's determination of
income clearly erroneous. 183
The court also summarily disposed of Dale's second claim, concern-
ing grain sales in the amount of $35,848.19.184 Once again, conflicting
evidence was presented at trial regarding the date that the grain was
actually sold.I85 The court stated that there was evidence supporting the
trial court's finding concerning the date of sale of the grain.t 86 After
reviewing the trial court's finding, the court stated that it was not left with
a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in including the
grain sales in the calculation of Dale Barth's 1996 income. 187
The third of Dale's claims focused on the trial court's refusal to
allow him a deduction of $45,271 in 1997 farm expenses.1 88 The trial
court based its decision to exclude the 1997 farm deductions from
Dale's income calculation as a sanction for discovery abuse. 189 The
court began its review of this decision by recognizing that North Dakota
administrative law provides procedural guidelines in determining a
177. See id. 23, 593 N.W.2d at 364.
178. See id. 24-26.
179. See id. 27-36, 593 N.W.2d at 364-67.
180. See id. 23, 593 N.W.2d at 364.
181. See id.
182. See id. Dale stated at trial that he could not come up with the $20,000 cash rent owed to his
father, so the grain was sold in his father's name. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. 24-26.
185. See id. 25. Dale maintained the grain sale took place in 1995, yet sworn testimony by an
employee of the Benson-Quinn Elevator stated a check was issued to Dale on January 12, 1996. See
id.
186. See id.
187. See id. 126.
188. See id. 27-35, 593 N.W.2d at 364-67.
189. See id. 27, 593 N.W.2d at 364. The trial court found Dale had failed to comply with dis-
covery requests and court orders requiring him to divulge information about his income over the past
five years. See id.
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farmer's income for calculating child support obligations.190 The court
acknowledged that an income calculation based on the exclusion of farm
deductions as a discovery sanction would create an artificially high child
support obligation.191 The court found that this consideration was far
outweighed, however, by the legitimate purposes of deterring discovery
abuses, promoting efficient litigation, and protecting the interests of all
litigants.192 The court constructed a Rule 37 framework within which to
analyze Dale's discovery abuses and to answer his claims that the sanc-
tions created an "uncertain, open ended and continuing penalty" and
that he "would be paying this penalty every month he pays child
support."1 93
Discussing the respective discovery responsibilities of parties, the
court reasoned that the information a party provides cannot be selective-
ly or substantially submitted. 194 The court restated the Vorachek hold-
ing that a party must comply with discovery requests completely,
accurately, and promptly.195 The court stated that its authority to impose
sanctions for discovery abuse is grounded in Rule 37 of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.196 The court proceeded to delineate
the two-part structure and requirements of Rule 37 and indicated the
situations in which each respective section applies. 197 The court first em-
phasized that unless the conduct that is the subject of the motion is
justified, the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion are
recoverable at the order of the court pursuant to North Dakota Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(A). 198 The court then explained the various
sanctions 'available when a court is faced with the failure by one party to
obey an order completely or permit discovery. 199 The court stated that
190. See id. 28, 593 N.W.2d at 365. "Farm businesses may experience significant changes in
production and income over time. To the extent that information is reasonably available, the average
of the most recent five years of farm operations, if undertaken on a substantially similar scale, must be
used to determine farm income." N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-05 (1995), amended by N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-05 (1999) (changing the wording from "farm businesses" to "businesses,"
"farm operations" to "business operations," and "farm income" to "business income").
191. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91,1 28, 593 N.W.2d 359, 365.
192. See id. (citing Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank, 421 N.W.2d 45, 51 (N.D. 1988) (determin-
ing that entering a default judgment as a sanction for discovery abuses was an inappropriate sanction
as a result of attorney's conflict of interest)).
193. Id. 27, 593 N.W.2d at 364-65 (citing Appellant's Brief at 12, Barth (No. 980241)).
194. See id. 29, 593 N.W.2d at 365 (quoting Vorachek 421 N.W. 2d at 51).
195. See id.
196. See id. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37.
197. See Barth, 29, 593 N.W.2d at 365. The first situation in which a Rule 37 sanction may be
imposed is when an order compelling discovery is granted or complied with after the motion is made.
See NJ). R. Civ. P 37(a). The second situation is when a party fails to obey a court order compelling
discovery. See N.D. R. Civ. P 37(b).
198. See id. (quoting N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A)).
199. See id. (explaining that the sanctions include, but are not limited to: refusing to admit certain
claims, prohibiting that party from introducing evidence, striking pleadings, dismissing the action, or
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when reviewing sanctions for abuse of discovery, the appropriate
standard is an abuse of discretion.
200
The court noted two justifications for imposing sanctions as a result
of noncompliance with discovery. 201 First, the court emphasized deter-
ring future abuse and second, penalizing parties who do not comply with
discovery requests. 202 The court emphasized the need for discovery
abuse sanctions to be tailored to the abuses alleged and that sanctions are
to be sufficiently and proportionally tailored to the severity of the
misconduct. 203
In a survey of the alleged discovery abuse by Dale, the court briefly
recited the alleged abuses and a timeline corresponding with those
abuses. 204 The court noted that Dale did not dispute the assertions made
by Nancy concerning his lack of cooperation and refusal to comply with
discovery. 205 The court cited a passage from Nancy's post-trial brief
which argued that Dale's 1997 farm expenses should be excluded in his
income determination calculation as a sanction for his noncompliance in
furnishing the requested information. 206 Concerning Dale's evasiveness
on financial matters, the court found it pertinent to note that at trial the
court admonished Dale for his behavior.207
The court indicated that previous decisions concerning compliance
with the rules of discovery mandated that discovery must be timely and
complete. 208 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that, even
though it may have ruled differently, the exclusion of farm expenses by
the trial court for Dale's intentional and evasive conduct was an appro-
priate sanction for his procedural misconduct.209 The court further
rendering a default judgment). See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
200. See Barth, 30, 593 N.W.2d at 365.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. (citing Dethloff v. Dethloff, 1998 ND 45, 16, 574 N.W.2d 867, 871 (stating that the
entering of a default judgment, although the ultimate of sanctions, was nonetheless appropriate based
on intentional delay, evasion, and nonresponsiveness); Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank, 421 N.W.2d
45, 51, 53 (N.D. 1988) (holding that the entering of default judgment as a sanction for discovery
abuses was a reversible error)).
204. See id. H 31-32, 593 N.W.2d at 365-66.
205. See id. 33, 593 N.W.2d at 366.
206. See id. The post-trial brief noted the fact that Nancy did not receive any supporting docu-
mentation prior to the date of trial and on the morning of the trial, Dale produced a list of expenses
without receipts or other documentation. See id.
207. See id. 1 34. The trial court admonished Dale for making hand signals to his father while his
father was being questioned as to the number of cattle on the farm. See id. The court interpreted the
hand signals to mean "do not answer the question." Id.
208. See id. 1 35, 593 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Dethloff, 14, 574 N.W.2d at 871 (concluding that a
default judgment as a sanction for discovery abuse was appropriate due to intentional delay, evasion,
and nonresponsiveness); Vorachek, 421 N.W.2d at 51 (stating complete, accurate, and timely com-
pliance with discovery rules is required)).
209. See id.
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determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing
the 1997 farm deductions in the calculation of Dale's income.
210
B. CHIEF JUSTICE VANDEWALLE'S SPECIAL CONCURRENCE
In a specially concurring opinion, Chief Justice VandeWalle began
by stating that he had no doubt that Dale was in contempt of court and
that the imposition of sanctions by the trial court was justified. 211 He
reiterated that the precedent established in Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v.
Brakke,2 12 allowing a trial court broad discretion to impose sanctions
when appropriate, was correct. 213 Chief Justice VandeWalle further
agreed that the abuse of discretion standard applies on appeal, and was
appropriate in this case.214
Despite the propriety of the sanctions, however, he expressed con-
cern regarding the use of the child support guidelines as a sanction
vehicle, albeit indirectly, by raising Dale's income and thereby raising
his child support obligation.2 15 He expressed his concern that "[c]hild
support should not be the football tossed between the parents in an
attempt to out maneuver one another as they dissolve the family." 216
Chief Justice VandeWalle reasoned that child support had been lifted
above the "fray" by legislative action through the Department of
Human Services.2 17
Chief Justice VandeWalle further speculated that, notwithstanding
trial court discretion, the court would have a difficult time sustaining a
child support reduction sanction due to a custodial parent's refusal to
comply with discovery in a spousal support or property division ac-
tion.2 18 Noting that other sanctions are available for such egregious
conduct, Chief Justice VandeWalle urged trial courts to stay as close as
possible to the statutorily promulgated child support guidelines.2 19 He
ended his concurrence with a message that "[d]istortions of the guide-
210. See id.
211. See id. 1 39, 593 N.W.2d at 367 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially) (citing Dakota
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke, 377 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1985)).
212. 377 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1985).
213. See Barth, 1999 ND 39, 593 N.W.2d 367 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially).
214. See id. 1 39, 593 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Brakke, 377 N.W.2d at 555).
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. See id. (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 481 N.W.2d 234, 235 (N.D. 1992) (stating that
under the guidelines, determinations of child support are applied by regulatory calculations resulting in
presumptively correct amounts)). North Dakota codified the child support guidelines, which statutorily
determines child support based on the obligor's net income and the number of children. See N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1 (1999).
218. See Barth, 40, 593 N.W.2d at 367.
219. See id. 141.
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lines for one purpose only serve to encourage that distortion for other
purposes."220
IV. IMPACT
The decision in Barth affirmed the trial court's valuation and
distribution of marital property and reinforced the equitable distribution
doctrine.221 Further, the Barth decision did not break new ground in the
imposition of sanctions for discovery abuses. 222 In fact, the North
Dakota Supreme Court recently cited Barth in Mid-Dakota Clinic, P.C.
v. Kolsrud223 as standing for the proposition that discovery rules require
"complete, accurate, and timely" compliance. 224 The citation to Barth
occurred in an opinion authored by Justice Maring, in which a unani-
mous court reversed and remanded a trial court decision vacating an
order to show cause.225 The court stated in Kolsrud that the court order
compelling answers to interrogatories was not void and under Rule
37(b)(2)(D), Appellant Kolsrud could be held in contempt for failing to
comply with the court order.226 While this affirmation of the Barth hold-
ing occurred within the context of a debtor/creditor action, it nonetheless
lends authority to the proposition that non-compliance with discovery in
North Dakota will result in immediate and oftentimes severe sanctions. 227
The most significant potential impact of the Barth decision stems
from the North Dakota Supreme Court's de facto affirmation of the trial
court's use of child support as a vehicle for sanctions, a concern voiced
by Chief Justice VandeWalle in his concurrence. 228 As Chief Justice
VandeWalle indicated, the court would be "hard pressed" to impose a
child support reduction sanction on the custodial parent when the par-
ent's refusal to comply with discovery concerned an income calculation
220. Id.
221. See id. 21, 593 N.W.2d at 364 (stating that upon a review of the record the court was not
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made).
222. See id. 1 36, 593 N.W.2d at 367 (concluding that the calculation of income was not clearly
erroneous in light of Rule 37 sanctions). See, e.g., Dethloff v. Dethloff, 1998 ND 45, 14, 574
N.W.2d 867, 871 (concluding that the ultimate sanction of default was appropriate because of
"intentional delay, evasion, and non responsiveness" to discovery requests that was characterized by
the court as "extreme, persistent, and willful").
223. 1999 ND 244, 603 N.W.2d 475.
224. See Mid-Dakota Clinic, P.C. v. Kolsrud, 1999 ND 244, 16,603 N.W.2d 475,480 (determin-
ing Rule 69 allows post judgment discovery absent a return of an unsatisfied writ of execution).
225. See id. 1 1, 603 N.W.2d at 476. The Supreme Court directed the trial court to issue a bench
warrant for the arrest of Margaret Kolsrud requiring her to appear and answer why she should not be
held in contempt for disobeying the trial court's orders. See id.
226. See id. 22, 603 N.W.2d at 480.
227. See generally N.D. R. Civ. P. 37.
228. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 39, 593 N.W.2d 359, 367 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring
specially).
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determination or division of property. 229 The decision may suggest that
child support can be the "carrot on a stick" hung in front of parents,
custodial and non-custodial, in order to force compliance with discovery
requests-a proposition found inappropriate in at least one other
jurisdiction. 230 The conditioning of visitation or custody might also act
as an incentive to parents in order to compel discovery-a proposition
also found inappropriate. 231
Furthermore, the Barth decision seems to allow the possibility that
an innocent party, the children, could be negatively impacted as a result
of their parent's discovery abuses-an idea also explicitly rejected in
another jurisdiction. 232 If the discovery abuse sanction creates an arti-
ficially high child support award, the non-custodial parent most likely
will be unable to make payment and as a result, the child may receive
little or no financial support. 233 By reaffirming the trial court's potential-
ly erroneous income determination for the computation of child support,
the North Dakota Supreme Court may have unknowingly contributed to
the eventual creation of a "deadbeat" dad. 234
The ability of a non-custodial parent to pay child support is usually
not predicated on a willingness to pay, but rather on an income level that
229. See id. 40.
230. See In re Marriage of Peper, 554 P.2d 727, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). The Colorado court
held that while the temporary abatement of spousal support may be an appropriate sanction incident to
contempt, the temporary abatement of child support is not. See id. The distinction between spousal
support and child support can be justified because the abatement of spousal support punishes the party
responsible for the behavior whereas the temporary abatement of child support could in effect punish
the children for acts of their parents. See id.
231. See Pace v. Solomon, 715 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The court deter-
mined that, despite the defiance of repeated court orders mandating visitation, the transfer of custody
as a sanction is inappropriate. See id. The court further stated that "[a] mere suggestion by a party
seeking enforcement of a contempt motion that a transfer of custody is an appropriate 'punishment'
for the contempt is not an acceptable substitute for providing notice that a hearing on custody will be
taking place." Id. at 1156-57.
232. See Edwards v. Edwards, 634 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that it was
reversible error to punish a party who was not responsible for a discovery violation).
233. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14, Barth (No. 980241). Dale Barth asserted that using the
actual income figures he has a net loss of $1,165.40 per month over the last five years and is unable to
pay the $452 per month child support payment as required in the judgment. See id.
234. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the Direction of
Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 32 (1994) (stating that the only information
available that discussed the reasons why fathers do not pay child support determined that 66% of the
custodial mothers that had received child support orders stated that the reason they had not received
payment was the father was unable to pay (citing General Accounting Office, Interstate Child




allows the child support obligation to be met. 235 By imposing a poten-
tially false income based on a sanction for discovery abuses, the court
may well have unknowingly overburdened Dale Barth.236 The problem
of overburdening obligors and reducing an already low or middle-
income obligor's income is that, statistically, these obligors tend to have
the greatest instability in their earnings. 237 Assuming that Dale could
afford to meet his child support burden under his current or future farm
income, a small disruption may well make the support burden unsus-
tainable.238 As a result, he may quickly fall prey to arrearages, with the
consequence of becoming another non-custodial parent unable to meet
his child support obligation. 239 The instability of a farming operation,240
coupled with the economic downturn in farming in general, 241 might
lead to an inability of Dale to make his child support obligation and
effectively turn him into a "deadbeat" dad.242 This could be especially
true in light of some scholars' assertions that at lower income levels,
existing child support guidelines create unsustainable burdens. 243
V. CONCLUSION
In Barth, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed what at first
glance appeared to be a routine appeal concerning the marital division
of property and Rule 37 sanctions.244 However, the majority of the court
may not have realized the practical effect that its affirmation of the trial
court's decision might have on the entire Barth family. If non-custodial
parents are unable to meet their support obligation as a result of
discovery sanctions, the financial impact on their children could be
235. See Appellant's Brief at 14, Barth (No. .980241) (observing that Dale does not dispute his
obligation to pay child support in some amount, evidenced by his paying of $189.00 per month as
stipulated in the interim order); see also Levesque, supra note 234, at 32 (stating that the best indicator
of whether a non-custodial parent will receive child support is employment stability of the obligor).
236. See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes Upon
Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 237 (1999) (discussing current problems related to low
and middle income obligors and child support guidelines and the possibility of creating "deadbeat"
dads).
237. See id. at 242.
238. See id.
239. See id. (stating a small disruption in earnings due to an already unstable job situation makes
another "deadbeat" dad).
240. See Appellant's Brief at 3, Barth (No. 980241). Dale's farming operation was "dried out"
in 1988, "hailed out" in 1989, "dried out" again in 1990, and "hailed out" again in 1991. Id.
241. See David Rogers, Senate, House Move on Separate Tracks on $12 Billion in Emergency
Spending, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1999, at A20 (detailing current congressional efforts to increase aid to
farmers and "boost a sagging farm economy").
242. See Levesque, supra note 234, at 32 (stating that instability of employment compounded with
low paying job results in low collection rates for low-income fathers); see also Appellant's Brief at 14,
Barth (No. 980241) (stating an inability to pay the amount stipulated based on his actual income).
243. See Henry, supra note 236, at 263-64.
244. See Barth v. Barth, 1999 ND 91, 593 N.W.2d 359, 361.
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significant. The importance of complying with discovery requests can-
not be understated, because it relates to the integrity and effectiveness of
the judicial system; therefore, Dale Barth deservedly should be punished.
Whether that punishment would be better served by a one-time fine held
in trust to his daughters or in the form affirmed in the Supreme Court
decision is a matter for debate.
Several questions remain after the decision in Barth. Should punish-
ment of a parent for discovery abuses unwittingly extend to his or her
children? Will practitioners in North Dakota see this decision as prece-
dent standing for the proposition that discovery sanctions can be used
in an offensive manner, a defensive manner, or both, to affect statutorily
promulgated guidelines? Would a custodial parent, sanctioned for
discovery abuses, receive the same treatment?
Joel Edgar Anderson
